第19回研究会

開催日：

2017年6月1日 (木)　17:30-19:00

会場：

丸の内永楽ビルディング18階 首都大学東京 丸の内サテライトキャンパス

報告者：

西原理氏(大阪大学 大学院経済学研究科 准教授)

タイトル：

Default and liquidation decisions under asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders

概要Abstract

We develop a dynamic model in which a distressed firm optimizes the bankruptcy choice and its timing. When shareholders of the distressed firm sell the assets, they are better informed about the asset value than outsiders. We show that this asymmetric information can delay the sales of assets to signal the asset quality to outsiders. More debt and lower asset value can lower the signaling cost and mitigate the delay in asset sales. Notably, we show that the firm changes the bankruptcy choice from selling out to liquidation bankruptcy when the signaling cost associated with the sales is high. This distortion in the bankruptcy choice greatly lowers the debt value, whereas its impact on the equity value is weak.